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Abstract
Econometric evidence suggests the existence of two dynamics in the postwar
U.S. housing market: (i) housing rental and purchase prices co-move positively in
response to productivity shocks, and (ii) the purchase price exhibits much larger
volatile movements than the rental price in response to the shocks. A standard
New Keynesian model with nominal rigidity in the production sector is inconsistent
with these facts. We incorporate a rental market into an otherwise standard New
Keynesian model with durables and show that nominal rigidity in the rental market
contributes to our empirical ¯ndings.
1 Introduction
New Keynesian (NK) models focus on characterizing monetary policies in the environ-
ment with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. These sticky-price models are
often abstracted from the rental market, and they focus solely on the production sector.
Empirically, we document two main features related to the evolution of housing rental
prices and purchase prices. First, these two prices co-move positively in response to
productivity shocks. Second, the purchase price is considerably more sensitive than the
rental price to exogenous shocks. We perform vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of the
U.S. quarterly total factor productivity (TFP), gross domestic output, rental and housing
purchase prices, and interest rate. We ¯nd that the purchase price exhibited a positive
response after the increase of about 0.6 percent one year after the shock and an increase
of about 0.8 percent two years after the shock. On the other hand, the corresponding
response sizes of the rental price were about 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively.
A standard NKmodel with housings is generally inconsistent with the abovementioned
¯ndings. This is because the price-rent ratio relationship plays a crucial role in the case
of a long-lived durable good. In a °exible-price economy with long-lived housing capitals,
the price-rent ratio increases in response to the persistently positive productivity shock.
This is because the currently purchased housing plays the role of an asset for the future.
However, when the housing purchase price is sticky, its adjustment process is triggered,
and hence, the rental price should be lowered instead. When the rental market does
not witness any friction, the rental price implicitly serves as a frictionless shadow price
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of the corresponding durable service °ows. Hence, when purchase prices are sticky and
rental prices are °exible, a persistently expansionary productivity shock slightly increases
purchase prices and signi¯cantly lowers the rental prices so that the price-rent ratio moves
e±ciently. This result is at odds with the fact that the two prices co-move in response to
a productivity shock.
In this paper, we show that the presence of nominal rigidity in the rental market can
reconcile an otherwise standard NK model with the empirical evidence of productivity
shocks on housing rental and purchase prices. The fundamental contribution of this paper
is as follows. First, the empirical evidence on rental price rigidity for housing services is
considerably more relevant than the evidence for sticky housing purchase prices. When
the rental price is sticky, the price adjustment cost induces a smaller user cost response
to exogenous shocks. The housing purchase price, therefore, should respond actively
so that the user cost equation holds in the equilibrium. This implies that the nominal
rigidity in the rental market can be one reason why the purchase price is volatile. Second,
the co-movement problem can be solved by the introduction of the nominal rigidity of
the rental price and shock persistence. In the existence of durables, two e®ects should be
considered. The ¯rst e®ect is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the purchases
of durable goods, as discussed in Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007). The second e®ect
is the consumption smoothing e®ect of durable services in response to a persistent shock.
When a shock is temporary, a household's demand in the impact period is at the highest
level because of the ¯rst e®ect. Hence, the purchase price and the price-rent ratio are
inclined to increase in the short run. Because ¯rms in the rental market can produce
durable services at a higher input cost, they want to increase their rental prices. With
the passage of time, the demand for the durable service decreases, and hence the purchase
and rental prices also decrease. On the other hand, when the shock is persistent, the level
of the household's demand in the impact period is not as high as that in the temporary
shock case because of the second e®ect. Because of the accumulation e®ect of total durable
stocks and the persistence of the exogenous shocks, it is expected that an economic boom
will occur in the near future. Therefore, the purchase price and rental price show an
increasing pattern in response to the increasing demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical evidence.
Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 de¯nes the equilibrium. Section
5 presents a descriptive analysis in the °exible case. Section 6 discusses a distortion
economy. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Productivity shocks and durable in°ation: the ev-
idence
In this section, we document two features that characterize the dynamic evolution of the
rental and purchase prices of housing. First, both the housing rental and purchase prices
increase in response to positive productivity shocks. Second, the volatility of housing
prices to productivity shocks is signi¯cantly larger than that of rental prices. In the
previous literature that employed VAR, measured TFP or measured labor productivity
is used as an explanatory variable to identify productivity shocks. For example, Beaudry
and Lucke (2009) assume that only TFP shocks may have contemporaneous e®ects on
measured TFP. Gal¶³ (1999) assumes that only productivity shocks can in°uence labor
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productivity in the long run. We follow these approaches to investigate the e®ect of
productivity shocks on housing rental and purchase prices.
To assess the impact of exogenous shocks, we estimate a VAR model for the U.S.
economy, speci¯ed as follows:
Xt =
LX
j=1
AjXt¡j +D +But; (1)
where ut is a vector of contemporaneous disturbances. The vector Xt comprises ¯ve
variables in the following order: (i) measured TFP, (ii) (imputed) rental price of housing,
(iii) gross domestic output, (iv) federal funds rate, and (v) purchase price of housing.
Except for the funds rate, all variables are in logs. Output and price variables are
normalized by the size of the working age population. The sample size is 1960Q1 to
2007Q2. A constant is included as a determinstic term, D, and six lags are selected that
were recommended by Akaike's information criterion.
To identify a productivity shock, we use a standard recursive identi¯cation scheme.
Our identi¯ed productivity shock is the only shock that can in°uence measured TFP in
the impact period. Therefore, the exogeneity of productivity can distinguish a produc-
tivity shock from other shocks. Fig. 1 displays the estimated responses of explanatory
variables to the estimated productivity shock. The blue lines represent the point es-
timates of each explanatory variable. The shaded areas represent two-standard error
bands. In response to the productivity shock, we can observe the boom of the economy
with the increase of output. Furthermore, in the second row, the rental and purchase
prices of housing show an increase. Point estimates of the housing purchase prices ex-
hibit an abrupt adjustment while the rental price exhibits a slow and steady adjustment
process. The response size of the purchase price is about 0.6 percent one year after the
shock and 0.8 percent two years after the shock. On the other hand, the corresponding
response sizes of the rental price are about 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. The
response of the interest rate is slightly negative in the impact period, and then, its sign
becomes positive.
As a robustness check, we also estimate a vector-error correction model. Two iden-
ti¯cation schemes are used: short-run restrictions and a combination of short-run and
long-run restrictions. The red dashed lines represent the responses with the latter iden-
ti¯cation scheme, and we have a robust result.
Our evidence, positive responses of housing rental and purchase prices to productivity
shocks, should not be viewed as evidence against the sticky price models. In a standard
NK model, prices decrease in response to productivity shocks. We re-estimate the six-
variable VAR model including the GDP de°ator, and ¯nd that the GDP de°ator decreases
in response to productivity shocks. In the following sections, we show that the prices can
increase in a sticky-price economy with long-lived durables.
3 The model
In this section, we develop an in¯nite-horizon economy with long-lived durable goods and
services and with corresponding prices. The key feature of our model is that durable goods
can be traded in two ways: as an ownership of a good or a lease contract of its service
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°ow in each period. To investigate the role of durable services and the corresponding
prices, we segment the durable market into product and service markets.
3.1 Household
The utility function of the representative household is given by
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
·
U(SD;t)¡ V (Nt)
¸
; (2)
where ¯ 2 (0; 1) is a subjective discount factor. SD;t denotes the total durable service °ows
to be consumed in period t, andNt denotes the amount of labor supplied in the production
sector. The period utility is assumed to be continuous and twice di®erentiable, with
USD;t ´ @U(SD;t)@SD;t > 0, USDSD;t ´
@2U(SD;t)
@S2D;t
· 0, VN;t ´ @V (Nt)@Nt · 0, and VNN;t ´
@2V (Nt)
@N2t
· 0.
The purchase of durable service is ¯nanced by the labor income, the ownership of
the intermediate ¯rms in the service and production sectors, government transfers, and
assets. The nominal budget constraint for all t is given by
rD;tSD;t +Rt¡1Bt¡1 = Bt +WtNt + ¡t + Tt;
where rD;t is a service price, Bt denotes a nominal bond, Rt denotes a nominal return of
the nominal bond, ¡t denotes dividends from the ownership of ¯rms in all sectors, and
Tt denotes the lump-sum transfer from the government.
Dividing this by the service price, rD;t, we obtain the real budget constraint:
SD;t +Rt¡1
bt¡1
¼rD;t
= bt +
Wt
rD;t
Nt +
¡t + Tt
rD;t
: (3)
We also assume that no Ponzi scheme holds:
lim
T!1
EtBT · 0
for all t.
3.1.1 Optimal allocation and implication
Given the initial value, b¡1, the household chooses the labor, consumption, and asset pro-
¯le fNt; SD;t; bt; g1t=0 to maximize (2) subject to (3). The ¯rst-order necessary conditions
become
¡ VN;t
USD;t
=
Wt
rD;t
; (4)
1 = ¯Et
·
USD;t+1
USD;t
Rt
¼rD;t+1
¸
: (5)
Equation (4) is the intra-temporal decision condition between the labor supply and
the consumption of durable service °ows in period t. Equation (5) is a standard Euler
condition with respect to the inter-temporal consumption decision of durable service °ows
for all t.
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3.2 Rental market
In the service market, a perfectly competitive ¯nal ¯rm purchases Dt(i) units from the
intermediate ¯rm i. The ¯nal ¯rm operates the production function
Dt ´
µZ 1
0
Dt(i)
"rD
¡1
"rD di
¶ "rD
"rD
¡1
;
where Dt(i) is the demanded quantity of the intermediate service i by the ¯nal ¯rm, and
"rD is the elasticity of substitution among di®erentiated varieties. The maximization of
pro¯ts yields the demand function for the intermediate service i for all t ¸ 0:
Dt(i) =
µ
rD;t(i)
rD;t
¶¡"rD
Dt; (6)
where rD;t ´
µR 1
0
rD;t(i)
1¡"rDdi
¶ 1
1¡"rD
is the service price index.
There is a continuum of ¯rms producing di®erentiated services indexed in the interval
[0; 1]. Each ¯rm i is a monopolistic competitor in the rental market, but, following
Rotemberg (1982), the ¯rm is assumed to face a quadratic cost proportional to the total
durable services in changing its price equal to
µrD
2
(
rD;t(i)
rD;t¡1(i)
¡ 1)2Dt, measured by the
¯nished service. µrD governs the magnitude of the price adjustment cost, measuring the
degree of sectoral nominal price rigidity.
If the intermediate service ¯rm i 2 [0; 1] can set a new price and input in period t, it
chooses rD;t(i) and ID;t to maximize
Et
1X
k=t
¤t;k
·
¡rD;t(i)¡
µrD
2
µ
rD;t(i)
rD;t¡1(i)
¡ 1
¶2
rD;tDt
¸
s.t. (6) and Dt(i) = (1¡ ±)Dt¡1(i) + ID;t(i);
where E is an expectation operator, and
¤t;k = ¯
k¡tUSD;k
USD;t
rD;t
rD;k
is a stochastic discount factor, where USD;t measures the marginal utility value to the
household of an additional unit of real pro¯ts during period t. Pro¯ts, ¡rD;t(i), are the
di®erence between rental revenue and the expenses of new purchases from the production
sector, and they are paid out as dividends to shareholders:
¡rD;t(i) ´ rD;t(i)Dt(i)¡ PD;t(i)ID;t(i):
± is a depreciation rate of housings and ID;t(i) is the newly purchased output °ows from
the production sector in period t. The \used" or second hand (1 ¡ ±)Dt¡1(i) stocks
returned to the intermediate ¯rm at the end of the previous period can be sold at PD;t(i)
in the current period. Thus, the intermediate ¯rms newly demand the durable goods as
much as Dt(i)¡ (1¡ ±)Dt¡1(i) from the ¯nal-good ¯rm in the production sector.
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In the symmetric equilibrium where rD;t(i) = rD;t for all i, the ¯rst order condition is
(¼rD;t ¡ 1)¼rD;t = Et
·
¤t;t+1
rD;t+1
rD;t
Dt+1
Dt
(¼rD;t+1 ¡ 1)¼rD;t+1
¸
+
"rD
µrD
½
¥rD;t ¡
"rD ¡ 1
"rD
¡ (1¡ ±)Et
·
¤t;t+1
rD;t+1
rD;t
¥rD;t+1
¸¾
: (7)
This equation implies that the current gross rental in°ation rate, ¼rD;t(´ rD;trD;t¡1 ), is a
function of the expected in°ation in the next period, ¼rD;t+1, and the real marginal cost
in period t in the rental sector, ¥rD;t. Furthermore, one distinctive feature is that an
additional term in°uences the current in°ation: the expectation of the real marginal cost
in the next period. This feature insulates the most important mechanism in our model.
Even in the case of °exible prices with µrD = 0, the real marginal cost is not constant:
¥rD;t =
1
¹rD
+ (1¡ ±)Et
·
¤t;t+1
rD;t+1
rD;t
¥rD;t+1
¸
; (8)
where ¹rD ´ "rD"rD¡1 is a mark-up in the rental sector. Note that the current real marginal
cost depends on the future real marginal cost. For example, the real marginal cost
increases as far as the future real marginal cost is positive.
3.3 Production sector
In the production sector, a perfectly competitive ¯nal-good producer purchases Yt(i) units
of intermediate good j. The ¯nal-good producer operates the production function
Yt ´
µZ 1
0
Yt(j)
"PD
¡1
"PD di
¶ "PD
"PD
¡1
;
where Yt(j) is the quantity of the intermediate good j demanded by the ¯nal-good pro-
ducer, and "PD is the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated varieties. The
maximization of pro¯ts yields the demand function for the intermediate good j for all t:
Yt(j) =
µ
PD;t(j)
PD;t
¶¡"PD
Yt; (9)
where the price index is PD;t ´
µR 1
0
PD;t(j)
1¡"PDdj
¶ 1
1¡"PD
.
There is a continuum of ¯rms producing di®erentiated products indexed in the interval
[0; 1]. A typical ¯rm j hires Nt(j) units of labor from households to produce Yt(j) units
of intermediate good j, using a linear production technology:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j); j 2 [0; 1]; (10)
where At is a productivity shock. at, which is a logarithm of the t-period productivity
shock in the production sector, follows
at+1 = ½aat + u
a
t+1; ½a 2 [0; 1); (11)
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where Etu
a
t+1 = 0 and Etu
a
tu
a0
t = ¾
a2.
Each ¯rm j is a monopolistic competitor in the product markets, but, following
Rotemberg (1982), the ¯rm is assumed to face a quadratic cost proportional to out-
put in changing its price equal to
µPD
2
(
PD;t(j)
PD;t¡1(j)
¡ 1)2Yt, measured by the ¯nished good.
µPD governs the magnitude of the price adjustment cost, measuring the degree of sectoral
nominal price rigidity.
Subject to (9) and (10), the intermediate ¯rm j 2 [0; 1] in the good sector who can
adjust its price in period t chooses its price and quantity to maximize
Ek
1X
t=k
¤t;k
·
¡PD;t(j)¡
µPD
2
µ
PD;t(j)
PD;t¡1(j)
¡ 1
¶2
PD;tYt
¸
:
Pro¯ts are the di®erence between the revenue and the expenses of paying for workers,
and they are immediately paid out as dividends, ¡PD;t(j), to shareholders:
¡PD;t(j) ´ PD;t(j)Yt(j)¡WtNt(j);
where Wt denotes a nominal wage rate.
In the symmetric equilibrium where PD;t(j) = PD;t for all j, the ¯rst order condition
becomes
(¼PD;t ¡ 1)¼PD;t =Et
·
¤t;t+1
PD;t+1
PD;t
Yt+1
Yt
(¼PD;t+1 ¡ 1)¼PD;t+1
¸
+
"PD
µPD
·
¥PD;t ¡
"PD ¡ 1
"PD
¸
; (12)
where ¼PD;t ´ PD;tPD;t¡1 is the gross producer in°ation rate, and ¥PD;t is the real marginal
cost in the production sector.
On solving cost minimization problems, we get the real marginal costs common to all
¯rms within the sector. In the case of °exible prices when µPD = 0, the real marginal
cost becomes
¥PD;t =
Wt
PD;tAt
=
1
¹PD
;
where 1
¹PD
´ "PD¡1
"PD
is a mark-up in the production sector.
3.4 Monetary policy
We assume that the monetary authority obeys the Taylor-type rule. We consider the
following instrument:
Rt
R
=
µ
¼rD;t
¼rD
¶½¼rDµ¼PD;t
¼PD
¶½¼PD
exp(´Rt );
where variables with no subscript denote the steady state levels of corresponding variables.
The discretionary monetary shock, ´Rt , is assumed to follow:
´Rt+1 = ½¼´
R
t + u
R
t+1; (13)
where Etu
R
t+1 = 0 and Etu
R
t u
0R
t = ¾
R2.
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3.5 Market clearing condition
The market clearing conditions in the service and good markets are
Dt = SD;t +
µrD
2
(¼rD;t ¡ 1)2Dt; (14)
Yt = ID;t +
µPD
2
(¼D;t ¡ 1)2Yt; (15)
where some proportions of the ¯nal service and good are allocated to resource costs
originating from price adjustment. Labor and bond markets also clear in the equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium consists of the allocations SD;t, bt, Nt, for households; the allocations Dt(i)
and ID;t(i), and price rD;t(i) for the rental service ¯rm i 2 [0; 1]; the allocations Yt(i) and
Nt(i), and price PD;t(i) for the housing producer i 2 [0; 1]. Along with wages Wt, that
satis¯es: taking prices and the wage given, the household's allocations solve its utility
maximizing problem; taking the wage and all prices but its own as given, the allocations
and the price of each rental service ¯rm solve its pro¯t maximizing problem; taking all
prices but its own as given, the allocations and the price of each housing producer solve
its pro¯t maximizing problem; taking the wage and all prices but its own as given, the
market for bonds and labor clear.
In the following sections, we investigate the di®erece between the allocations of the
e±cient and distorted economies.
5 E±cient allocation
5.1 Standard user cost in a frictionless economy
To ¯nd the details of the price relationship between rent and purchase, we derive a
traditional user cost equation in a frictionless economy. In the case that the rental price
is °exible, the intermediate service ¯rm's ¯rst-order-condition equation (8) with respect
to the rental price becomes
rD;t = ¹rD
½
PD;t ¡ (1¡ ±)Et
·
PD;t+1
Rt
¸
+ ¶t
¾
; (16)
where ¶t ´ ¡(1¡ ±)COVt
µ
PD;t+1;¤t;t+1
¶
(17)
and 1
Rt
= Et¤t;t+1 is a risk-free bond rate from the durable service Euler equation. The
current user cost is determined by four components. The rental-sector mark-up, ¹rD ,
ine±ciently raises the current user cost, rD;t. The current nominal marginal cost, PD;t,
also directly raises the user cost. Most interestingly, the third and fourth terms are the
expected value for the leftover stocks after depreciation. In a long-lived durable economy,
the third term mitigates the increase of the user cost. When it is expected that the good
price in the next period will increase, after the interest rate is discounted, the burden of
the current purchase will be eased. This is because the remaining housing stocks become
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the future asset with a higher price. Thus, the user cost decreases as the expectation
of the future purchase price increases. In the last term, the covariance of the expected
resale price with the households' marginal utility of consumption in t + 1 re°ects the
excess return from durable investment. Unlike the risk-free bond, the current purchase of
the housings is in°uenced by the future risk. In general, this covariance term is negative,
and hence, the risk premium increases the user cost.
5.1.1 Frictionless user cost
Consider a perfectly competitive market case where "rD converges to in¯nity. In this case,
the model can be interpreted as a variant of Lucas' (1978) asset pricing model.1 Iterating
the user cost equation forward, the nominal marginal cost of the investor becomes
PD;t =
1X
k=t
(1¡ ±)k¡tEt
·
rD;k ¡ ¶k
¦kl=tRl¡1
¸
; (18)
where the left-hand side represents the nominal marginal cost of housing durables in
period t, which is the purchase price from the production sector, while the right-hand
side is composed of the corresponding rental gains and risk premium from period t on.
The implication is straightforward: the purchase price of housing should be equated to
the present value of earnings from the corresponding services and risk premium.
5.1.2 Frictionless price-rent ratio
We can also derive a price-rent ratio in line with the Lucas-tree model. We can interpret
the real marginal cost, ¥rD;t, as a price-rent ratio of the service ¯rm. It can be written
as a function of the depreciation rate and the marginal utility gap:
¥rD;t = Et
½P1
k=t[(1¡ ±)¯]k¡tUSD;k
USD;t
¾
: (19)
This equation has at least two important implications. First, the price-rent ratio is an
increasing function of durability, (1¡±). High durability implies that the purchased good
survives for a long period, and hence, the value of the good also increases. Second, the
price-rent ratio is a function of the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between
today and the future. We call these terms marginal utility gaps. Because the households
are the owners of service ¯rms, the ¯rms' current and future pro¯ts can be valued in
terms of the gaps of marginal utility of consumption, which are USD;t and USD;k+1 for all
k ¸ t. If the marginal utility of the consumption in the future is relatively higher than
the current marginal utility, the price-rent ratio increases. When the households lend
greater value to future consumption, the price-rent ratio should increase.
5.1.3 Descriptive analysis
To learn the dynamics of two prices, we analyze how our model economy reacts to ex-
ogenous shocks. Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the impulse responses under a di®erent
1The major di®erence is that his model is an endowment economy with no depreciation rate, while in
our model, durable goods are depreciated and there are always new production in each period. Therefore,
our model always has transactions of durable goods and services even in the steady state.
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durability to a persistent technology shock: quarters after the shock, from the impact
to the 32nd periods, are plotted on the x-axis; the degree of durability is plotted on
the y-axis, from 0 to 1; and the response scale is plotted on the z-axis. The responses
of service °ow in the rental market and new output °ow in the production market are
respectively displayed in the ¯rst row. When the depreciation rate is 100 percent (± = 1),
both the service and output °ows feature the same responses because this situation is
the case with a only nondurable goods' economy.2 The existing total stock against the
new production ratio, the so-called stock-°ow ratio, in the steady state is a function of
durability: a lower depreciation rate increases the volume of the total stocks compared to
new production °ows. Therefore, as the durability increases, the response of the durable
stocks and the corresponding service °ows are smoothed while the output °ows show a
more active response. It is well known that durable goods respond more sensitively than
nondurable goods to macro shocks such as productivity and monetary shocks. For exam-
ple, Basu and Fernald (1997) ¯nd that durable industries are more cyclical, employing a
large share of the marginal inputs in a boom. In our model, this is the case because the
service ¯rms' capital gain is an increasing function of durability.3 Therefore, the response
scale of output °ows becomes bigger. Furthermore, the consumption of service °ows ex-
hibits a hump-shaped response because newly produced output °ows get accumulated in
the short run.
The price-rent ratio shows positive signs in all regions. When the depreciation rate
is 100 percent, the price-rent ratio does not deviate from one. This is because the price
of nondurable goods equals the corresponding service price. The price-rent ratio in the
steady state is an increasing function of durability because high durability means sus-
tained high earnings. Its response to the productivity innovation depends on the sequence
of the marginal utility gap:
¥^rD;t = [(1¡ ±)¯]Et(U^SD;t+1 ¡ U^SD;t) + [(1¡ ±)¯]2Et(U^SD;t+2 ¡ U^SD;t) + ¢ ¢ ¢ ;
which is a log-linearized version of equation (19).4 When durability is considerably low
or the shock is temporary, the path of marginal utility gaps (U^SD;k+1¡ U^SD;t for all k ¸ t)
are positive in general because the future consumption is lower. On the other hand,
when durability is high and the expansionary shock is persistent, a consumption boom
is expected in the near future. Expecting future demands for the currently purchased
durables, service ¯rms demand more durables and the prices increase.5 Thus, the price-
rent ratio gap exhibits little deviation in the short run under the negative marginal utility
gap e®ect. Overall, the price-rent ratio shows a hump-shaped response.
The nominal interest rate exhibits a positive sign in a long-lived durable economy. No
arbitrage condition between the purchases of bonds and durable goods should hold:
Rt = Et(Zt); (20)
2On the other hand, when the depreciation rate reaches zero percent, the economy converges to the
Lucas-tree economy.
3Another explanation is that the elasticity of substitution for the purchase of durable goods is much
higher. For example, see Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007).
4The hatted value denotes the log-deviation of the corresponding value from the steady state level.
5In other words, the response of durable consumption shows a hump-shaped response because of the
high accumulation e®ect of durable goods. Therefore, the marginal utility gaps are negative until the
future durable consumption returns to the level in the impact period.
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from equation (16). The right-hand side represents a one-period holding return, Zt ´
(1¡±)PD;t+1
PD;t¡¹¡1rD;trD;t+¶t
, from buying the durable goods in period t and selling them on period
t + 1. The term in the numerator is the capital gain. It is divided by the net purchase
price in the denominator to provide a rate of return. Therefore, the returns of riskless
bonds and the expected return in investing durable goods are the same.6 In the economy
where the expected return of durable investment is high, the return of riskless bonds also
should increase.
6 Co-movement and volatility
In this section, we analyze the cases where the distortions exist in each sector.
6.1 Sticky purchase price
When the purchase price is sticky, the relationship of the purchase price with the nominal
wage rate becomes
PD;t =
ªPD;tWD;t
At
; (21)
where ªPD;t ´
·
1
1
¹PD
+ÃPD;t
¸
.7 ªPD;t is an e±ciency parameter in the production sector:
the ¯rst term in the denominator represents the mark-up friction, and the second term,
ÃPD;t, is a distortion from the price stickiness in the good sector. Note that when the
production sector is perfectly competitive (¹PD = 1) and the purchase price is °exible
(µPD = 0 and ÃPD;t = 1), all distortions disappear (ªPD;t = 1). In this case, the movement
of the real wage replicates the productivity innovation. However, ªPD;t deviates from its
e±cient level when the purchase price is sticky. Thus, the ¯rms in the production sector
set the current prices ine±ciently at a lower level than in the °exible case and vice versa.
For example, in a case where the ¯rms intend to increase their prices today, a positive
gap may occur between current in°ation and the expectation of future in°ation in the
production sector. In this case, the price adjustment cost depresses the ¯rms' decision.
6.2 Sticky rental price
In a case where the rental price is sticky, the user cost equation becomes
rD;t = ªrD;t
½
PD;t ¡ (1¡ ±)Et
·
PD;t+1
Rt
¸
+ ¶t
¾
; (22)
where ªrD;t ´
·
1
1
¹rD
+ÃrD;t
¸
.8 ªrD;t is an e±ciency parameter that consolidates all frictions
in the service sector. 1=¹rD , the ¯rst term in the denominator, represents the friction
6Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2007) analyze the di®erence between °exible and ¯xed rates in the
housing market. We do not analyze those e®ects in this paper.
7ÃPD;t ´ µPD"PD
½
(¼D;t ¡ 1)¼D;t ¡ ¯Et
·
USD;t+1
USD;t
¥rD;t+1
¥rD;t
Yt+1
Yt
(¼D;t+1 ¡ 1)¼D;t+1
¸¾
.
8ÃrD;t ´ µrD"rD
½
(¼rD;t ¡ 1)¼rD;t ¡ ¯Et
·
USD;t+1
USD;t
Dt+1
Dt
(¼rD;t+1 ¡ 1)¼rD;t+1
¸¾
.
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originating from the monopolistic competition, and ÃrD;t represents distortion from the
price stickiness. Note that this equation holds even when the purchase price is sticky.
6.3 The relationship between nominal rigidity and co-movement
Fig. 3 displays the e®ect of a productivity shock on the selected variables. Two cases
are exhibited: (i) sticky purchase prices (and °exible rental prices) and (ii) sticky rental
prices (and °exible purchase prices). The key parameters are the physical depreciation
rate, ±, and the price adjustment costs, µPD and µrD . For calibration, we consider a
housing market where the degree of price stickiness in the service market is high while
the purchase price is °exible. In the preceding literature, the annual depreciation rate of
housing is shown to be between 1 percent to 5 percent in the U.S. economy, so we calibrate
± on a quarterly basis as ± = 0:05
4
. Following Genesove (2003), we set the degree of nominal
rigidity in the rental market, so that the annual probability of no rental price adjustment
is 0.29. In the counterfactual simulation, we assume the same degree of nominal rigidity
in the production sector. For a central bank's rule, we assume a simple Taylor rule that
responds to the sticky in°ation rate, ½i (for i 2 f¼PD ; ¼rDg): the coe±cient parameter is
set to be two and the others to be zero.
We start with the benchmark case of a standard NK model with sticky price in the
production sector. The blue lines represent the sticky purchase prices and °exible rental
prices case. In this case, the rental price falls substantially in response to the shock.
This is caused by the nominal rigidity of the purchase price in the production sector. As
we saw in the °exible price case, the purchase price and the price-rent ratio are likely
to increase. However, when the purchase price is sticky, the adjustment cost depresses
the production ¯rms to increase their goods' prices enough. Instead, the rental price
in the frictionless rental market e±ciently replicates the price-rent ratio. Note that the
price-rent ratio is e±cient when the rental market is frictionless.
The red dashed lines in the middle panels represent the price dynamics when the
rental price is sticky and the purchase price is °exible. These graphs present at least
two interesting features. The nominal rigidity of the rental price becomes one reason
to make the purchase price volatile. Since the rental price, rD;t, is stable or motionless,
the housing price, PD;t, should respond to the shocks. A considerably high degree of
rental price stickiness induces a large swing of the purchase prices to equate the user cost
equation. More interestingly, two prices show an increasing pattern after the introduction
of the nominal rigidity of the rental price and the shock persistence.
6.4 The relationship between shock persistence and co-movement
Fig. 4 displays the impulse responses to the di®erent persistences of productivity shocks.
The panels in the ¯rst column display the sticky purchase price case, and the co-movement
behavior is not observed in all cases. The panels in the second column are the responses
under the sticky rental price economy. We observe that the co-movement behavior dis-
appears when the shock persistence is low.
In the existence of durables, two e®ects should be considered. The ¯rst e®ect is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the purchases of durable goods, as discussed
in Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007). The second e®ect is the consumption smoothing
e®ect of durable services in response to the persistent shock.
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When the shock is temporary, the demand for the rental services of households is at
the highest level in the impact period because of the ¯rst e®ect.9 Hence, the purchase
price and the price-rent ratio are inclined to increase in the short run. Because ¯rms in
the rental market can produce rental services at a higher input cost, the rental service
¯rms want to increase their rental prices. With the passage of time, the demand for the
durable service decreases, and hence, the purchase and rental prices also decrease. On
the other hand, when the shock is persistent, the households' rental demand level in the
impact period is not as high as the temporary shock case because of the second e®ect.
Because of the accumulation e®ect of the total durable stocks and the persistence of the
exogenous shocks, it is expected that the future demand for the rental services will be
higher and an economic boom will occur in the near future. Therefore, the purchase price
and rental price show an increasing pattern in response to the increasing demand.
6.5 Does the rental price stickiness amplify the purchase price
volatility?
Asset price volatility has been a recurring concern in the preceding asset market lit-
erature.10 In the previous studies that aim to identify the relationship between stock
prices and dividends, the stability of dividends were considered as one of reasons for
the volatile movements of stock prices. For example, Shiller (1981) investigates whether
the excessively volatile movements of stock prices are justi¯ed by subsequent changes in
dividends. Cochrane (1992) reports the characteristics of price-dividend ratio variances
that are re°ected by the dividend growth as well as discount rates. Furthermore, in
the new-open-economy-macro literature, a high volatility for a nominal exchange rate
and the terms of trade can be explained by the nominal price rigidity in the domestic
market. For example, Gali and Monacelli (2005) show that a policy of strict domestic
in°ation targeting implies a substantially great volatility in the nominal exchange rate
and terms of trade. Therefore, we analyze whether the volatility of the purchase price
can be explained by the nominal rigidity of the rental price.
It is well known that housing productions and the corresponding prices are consider-
ably more volatile than nondurable goods and prices in the business cycle movements.
For example, Iacoviello and Neri (2010) show that the cyclical standard deviation of hous-
ing productions is almost ¯ve times as volatile as that of the nondurable consumption in
the U.S. economy: 9.97 versus 1.22. This also holds for the prices: 1.87 versus 0.40. In
our model, these high volatilities can be explained by the stickiness in the rental mar-
ket. When the user cost is sticky and the purchase price is °exible, the purchase price
becomes volatile in response to the exogenous shocks. From equation (22), the user cost
on the left-hand side does not move much when ªrD in the right-hand side is low (ÁrD
is high). Therefore, when an exogenous shock, such as a productivity innovation, occurs,
the purchase price on the right-hand side should be adjusted.
Fig. 5 depicts the standard deviations of the simulated variables.11 As the rental
price rigidity increases, the standard deviation of the user cost in°ation decreases. On
the other hand, the rental price stickiness let the purchase price become more volatile.
9The same e®ect was analysed by Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) under the temporary monetary
shock.
10For example, see Lucas (1989).
11We perform the numerical simulation using the methods described by Uhlig (1999).
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The price-rent ratio also becomes very volatile as the nominal rigidity of the user cost
increases. Cochrane (2011) discusses that the movements of the price-rent ratio are largely
explained not by the dividend growth rate but by the sequence of the stochastic discount
factors. However, Fig. 5 reveals that the purchase price in°ation and the price-ratio
volatility correspond to the degree of the nominal rigidity of user cost in°ation.
7 Concluding remarks
How do the prices in the housing market respond to productivity shocks? Empirical
evidence reveals that both the rental and purchase prices in the housing sector increase
in response to productivity shocks.
In this paper, we incorporate the rental market into the otherwise conventional sticky
price model with long-linved durables. We show that the behavior of rental prices and
purchase prices depends heavily on where the nominal rigidity originates. If the purchase
price in the production sector is sticky, the co-movement phenomenon observed in the
data cannot be generated. When all prices are °exible, the purchase price and the price-
rent ratio are inclined to increase in response to productivity shocks. However, when
the purchase price is sticky, it does not increase enough compared to the °exible price
economy. Therefore, the rental-service ¯rm, a price taker of the purchase price, can
purchase the new output at a low input cost, and hence, can o®er rental services at a
lower price. This is at odds with the empirical ¯ndings.
The purchase price volatility and co-movement of two prices can be resolved by the
introduction of the nominal rigidity of rental prices. When the rental price is sticky, it
becomes motionless. Instead, the purchase price positively reacts to the shocks. The
rental-service ¯rm should consider the future rental demand for the current purchase.
Furthermore, when the shock is persistent, the demand for the rental services shows a
hump-shaped pattern, and hence, the rental price and the purchase price also increase.
Several unresolved issues need to be pursued in future works. First, in this paper,
we do not consider a case where goods with di®erent durabilities coexist. Many di®erent
characteristics introduce many goods. Second, we need to introduce other features into
the model in order to capture more implications of exogenous shocks to durable goods.
The lumpiness of durables or news shocks can be good examples. Third, we only consider
the case of a rational response to the shocks. The introduction of irrational behavior may
be necessary to explain the recent housing market boom and bust in the U.S. economy.
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Appendix A: deterministic steady state
We consider a steady-state in which all the shocks are zero and in which monetary
policymakers set their respective CPI in°ation rates to zero:
¼rD = 1;¼PD = 1:
Equation (5) implies the nominal interest rate and the price of claims become:
R =
1
¯
:
The real marginal costs are
¥rD =
¹¡1rD
1¡ (1¡ ±)¯ ; ¥PD = ¹
¡1
PD
:
Compared to the production sector, the real marginal cost in the rental sector is higher.
The real wage becomes:
w = ¥PD :
We set the steady state labor level as one third. (N = 1=3) Then combining produc-
tion functions, the good market conditions, and the law of motion of durable goods, we
get
N = Y = ID = ±D
) D = 1
3±
:
From the rental market clearing condition
SD = D:
Appendix B: Calibration and numerical simulation results
Time is in quarters and we set the quarterly discount factor as ¯ = 0:99. It implies that
the annual real interest rate is pinned down by the household's patience rate and is equal
to 4 %. The annual depreciation rate for houses is 5 % (± = 0:05=4). Following Monacelli
(2009), the elasticity of substitution between varieties in the non-durable and the durable
sectors "PD and "PC are set equal to 6, which yields a steady state mark-up of 20 %.
In the benchmark case, we set the degree of nominal rigidity in service and good
prices to generate a frequency of price adjustment of about four quarters. Let · be
the probability of not resetting prices in the standard Calvo-Yun model. Log linearized
Phillips curve in this model is "
µ
, while it is (1¡·)(1¡¯·)
·
in the Calvo-Yun model. A price
rigidity of four quarters is a standard in the recent literature so we take it as a benchmark
parameter (· = 0:75).
The period utility function is assumed to be:
S¾¡1D;t
¾¡1 ¡ ºN
1+Á
t
1+Á
. Following the existing
literature on durable goods, we set ¾ = 1 and Á = 1. In the analysis of optimal monetary
policy, we change the value of ¾ and search for the implication of welfare. The elasticity
parameter, Á, is set to one in all cases. Therefore, the scale parameter, º, is adjusted for
the intra-temporal condition to hold in equality with the change of durability.
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Fig. 1: Impulse responses to the productivity shock
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Note: The responses to the one percent increase in TFP innovation. The shaded areas represent the
two standard deviation bands.
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Fig. 2: Response to persistent productivity shock (°exible case)
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Note: The responses to the one percent increase in productivity. This is a persistent case with ½a = 0:9.
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Fig. 3: Sticky purchase price versus sticky rent price
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Note: The responses to the one percent increase in productivity. This is a persistent case with ½a = 0:9.
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Fig. 4: Di®erent degree of shock persistency
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Fig. 5: Standard deviations with di®erent rigidity
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Note: The values in the x-axis correspond to the Calvo parameters. For example, 0.75 implies the ¯rms
can change their prices once a year. The brightest yellow line is the case when ± = 0:1, and the darkest
line is the case when ± = 1.
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